Previous studies show that crude oil is negatively correlated with stocks but has almost the same rate of return as stocks, and so adding crude oil into a portfolio with equities can provide significant diversification benefits for the portfolio. Given the diversification benefit of crude oil mixed with equities, we examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers. Differing from traditional corporate risk management literature, this study examines corporate derivatives transactions from the shareholders' diversification perspective. The results show that crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers do impact value. If oil and gas producing companies stop shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, company stock prices increase significantly. In contrast, if oil and gas producing companies initiate short positions in crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices drop marginally significantly. Thus, hedging by producers is not necessarily good. Transaction limitation is shown to be one of the possible sources of the value effect of corporate derivatives transactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) , even if corporate derivatives transactions can improve the risk and return profiles of shareholders' portfolios, shareholders still may not value those transactions because in perfect markets shareholders themselves can enter into the same derivatives transactions as companies. Nonetheless, in the presence of market imperfections or poor diversification, there is a possibility that shareholders might not obtain the same risk and return profile as provided by corporate derivatives transactions.
Shareholders then could have the motivation to value corporate derivatives transactions.
Traditional corporate risk management literature 1 examines corporate derivatives transactions from the point of view of specific transactions and identifies some market imperfections that incur deadweight costs for firms.
Expected financial distress costs, underinvestment problems, tax schedule convexity, managerial risk aversion, information asymmetry, contracting costs, transaction costs, economies of scale, and transaction limitations are all possible market imperfections that motivate companies to enter into derivatives transactions. They assume that derivatives transactions reduce the volatility of expected operating cash flow and thus the volatility of individual firms. As a result of hedging activity, the deadweight costs caused by market imperfections are decreased. Companies need to keep less equity for possibly incurred deadweight costs. Consequently, companies have more equity for other valuable investment opportunities. In this sense, derivatives transactions increase firm value.
Although Mayers and Smith (1990) show that closely held corporations are more likely to demand for insurance than are widely held corporations and contend that risk aversion of ill-diversified shareholders is an incentive for firm to buy reinsurance, no previous study has investigated corporate derivatives transactions from the shareholders' diversification perspective. This study contributes to the risk management literature by investigating the value effect of corporate derivatives transactions from the shareholders' diversification perspective.
According to previous studies on corporate risk management, when oil and gas producers take a short position on crude oil derivatives contracts, such transaction may reduce firm volatility and increase firm value. In contrast, if those transactions are examined from the shareholder' diversification perspective, the market value of shareholders' portfolios may be negatively affected. Previous studies did not consider the diversification benefits of derivatives transactions before they examined the value effect. We contend that both diversification benefits and market imperfections are conditions on which corporate derivatives transactions have value effect. Diversification benefits motivate shareholders to enter the same derivatives transactions as companies, and then market imperfections cause the value effect. Therefore, we should consider diversification benefits before examining the value effect.
Traditional commodity investment studies 2 show that energy commodities provide significant diversification benefits for a traditional portfolio consisting of stocks and bonds because these commodities are usually zero or negatively correlated with stocks and bonds, but with rates of return not less than the risk free rate. Thus firms that short crude oil futures or forward contracts actually take the diversification benefits of crude oil away from shareholders' portfolios, while firms that reduce or remove short transactions actually provide diversification benefits for shareholders' portfolios. Therefore, short transactions in the oil and gas producing industry are expected to have negative effects on the risk and return profiles of shareholders' portfolios, while reducing or removing short transactions would improve the risk and return profiles of shareholders' portfolios. Given these findings, this study examines the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers.
Before the establishment of commodity Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) in 2006, there were barriers that block investors from direct holdings of commodities by themselves. Therefore, investors have the motivation to value the commodity derivatives transactions by corporations. When oil and gas producers enter short transactions on crude oil derivatives contracts, these producers reduce shareholders' exposure to crude oil. Shareholders' portfolios then become less diversified, and thus shareholders will not value those transactions. When oil and gas producers remove short positions in crude oil derivatives contracts, shareholders of these producers regain the exposure to crude oil. Shareholders' portfolios then become better diversified, and thus shareholders will value those transactions.
In imperfect and incomplete markets, when derivatives transactions improve the diversification of shareholders, transaction limitation hinders shareholders from obtaining the same diversification benefit via derivatives transactions by themselves. Therefore, transaction limitation is one of the possible sources of the value effect.
No previous study has empirically tested the value effect caused by transaction limitation.
To examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers, we select oil and gas producing firms which have changed their derivatives policies during the period of 1996 -2005. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around derivatives policy changes and investigate if there is a significant relationship between CARs and derivatives position changes measured by hedge ratio changes.
We find that when oil and gas producing companies stop shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, there is a very significant and negative relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes. Since the hedge ratio of a short position is negative, this result implies that removing short positions is associated with higher CARs. Shareholders do not like oil and gas producing companies to hedge. They want these companies to stop hedging. When these companies stop hedging, the value effect is reflected in a stock price increase and shareholders' wealth increase. This fact is consistent with our expectation that removing short positions on crude oil derivatives contracts by oil and gas producing companies has a value effect. When oil and gas producing companies start shorting crude oil contracts, we find negative and marginally significant market reactions. This result shows that when oil and gas producing companies start shorting, shareholders do not value this hedging policy. Hedging by oil and gas producers has a negative value effect.
Then, we go further by investigating the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and a proxy variable for transaction limitation in order to investigate the magnitude of the value effect caused by transaction limitation.
According to Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) , we use firm size to represent transaction limitation of investors. We take CARs as the dependent variable and take firm sizes and hedge ratio changes as independent variables to conduct a regression, and find a significant and positive relationship between CARs and firm sizes. This result suggests that transaction limitation is one of the possible sources of the value effect.
In short, the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions depends on the diversification benefit of crude oil and the existence of transaction limitation that limits the means available for investors to obtain exposure to oil. If crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers improve the diversification profiles of shareholders' portfolios, transaction limitation motivates shareholders to value these transactions. If crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers have a negative effect on the diversification of shareholders' portfolios, however, transaction limitation causes these transactions to have a negative value effect. Hedging by oil producers is not necessarily good.
This study sheds light on the importance of corporate risk management activities. Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) report that 18 out 28 (64%) of airline companies have hedged during the period from 1992 to 2003. This study finds that only about 20% of oil producing companies have used derivatives during the period from 1996 to 2005. Our conclusion may provide some explanation why more than 60% of airline companies hedge while only about 20% of oil and gas producing firms hedge. Risk management activities in the airline industry might be important since airline companies usually take long transactions in crude oil. In contrast, oil and gas producing firms should stop hedging because short transactions by these firms decrease shareholders' wealth.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes literature review.
Section III develops hypothesis. Section IV discusses data and sample. Section V presents methodology. Section VI reports results. Section VII concludes. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 1. Hedging reduces the expected costs of financial distress. In an imperfect market, financial distress is costly. Reducing the expected financial distress cost is an incentive for firms to hedge. Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that a firm's probability of financial distress depends on the volatility of expected cash flow and level of debt. Hedging can reduce the volatility of earnings, and thus the probability of bankruptcy and the expected costs of financial distress. Stulz (1996) states that hedging can increase firm value if the lower part of risk is reduced while the upper part of risk is maintained. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms with less coverage of fixed claims are more likely to hedge. Mian (1996) shows evidence inconsistent with financial distress cost motivation. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) 3. Tax concern is also a rationale for hedging. Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) contend that if a firm has a convex tax schedule, the expected after-tax profit will have more concavities. Hedging reduces the volatility of taxable income and the firm's expected tax liability. The reduction of expected tax liability increases firm value. Stulz (1996 ), Ross (1996 , and Leland (1998) conclude that a reduction of cash flow volatility increases financial leverage level and generates higher tax shields. Tax shields add firm value. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms with more convex tax functions are more likely to hedge. Graham & Smith (1999) use simulation methods to investigate tax convexity and find that, on average, tax schedules are convex and for firms with convex tax schedules, the average tax savings are about 5.4% for a 5% taxable income volatility reduction.
II. Literature Review
4. Managerial risk aversion is another possible motivation for companies to hedge. Stulz (1984) and Smith & Stulz (1985) think that if managers' utility functions are concave, and managers' compensations are related to the earning or cash flow volatility, then managers want to reduce corporate volatility. If managers cannot effectively reduce corporate volatility by themselves, they will reduce volatility through corporate hedging activities.
Nonetheless, if stock options are a significant part of managers' compensation packages, managers are more willing to take risks instead of reducing volatility. Tufano (1996) finds that manager's risk aversion is a motivation for hedging. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find only a modest relationship between the managerial risk aversion and hedging. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find that the managerial risk aversion is not related to hedging. Haushalter (2000) does not support that managerial risk aversion is related to corporate hedging.
5. Hedging can be used to reduce contracting costs. One kind of agency problem between stockholders and bondholders is the "underinvestment problem" stated by Myers (1977) . The compensation for the underinvestment problem is one kind of agency cost. Mayers and Smith (1987) show that it is less likely for shareholders to default on promised debt payments after hedging, so hedging reduces this kind of deadweight cost. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms with more growth options are more likely to hedge. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) conclude that the underinvestment problem is a motivation for hedging. Gay and Nam (1998) emphasize that company derivatives use is positively related to the underinvestment problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider "asset substitution" as another kind of agency problem. Hedging reduces the probability of default and the contracting cost associated with the asset substitution. Mian (1996) finds evidence mixed with respect to contracting costs. Leland (1998) believes that hedging benefits are greater when agency costs are low.
6. Economies of scale are another motivation for corporations to hedge. There are economies of scale both in getting information and tools on hedging strategies, and in the transaction costs of derivatives. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms with larger sizes are more likely to hedge. Mian (1996) shows that risk management activities involve significant fixed costs. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1990) , Irwin, Krukemyer and Zulauf (1993) , and Fung and
Hsieh (2000) showed that for publicly offered commodity funds, fees are substantially higher than those charged by hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (2000) state that high fees and transactions cost make commodity funds unpopular.
In crude oil is to own the equities of oil and gas producing companies. When oil and gas producers enter short transactions on crude oil derivatives contracts, these producers reduce shareholders' exposure to crude oil. Shareholders' portfolios become less complete, and thus the market value of their portfolios decreases.
When oil and gas producers remove short position on crude oil derivatives contracts, shareholders of these producers regain the exposure to crude oil.
Shareholders' portfolios become more complete, and thus the market value of shareholders' portfolios increases.
This study investigates whether the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around the announcements of crude oil derivatives positions change are significantly related to crude oil derivatives positions change. We use hedge ratio changes to measure derivatives positions changes. We forecast that more short positions removed will cause higher stock prices around the announcements.
Since the hedge ratio for short transactions is negative, it is expected that there is a significantly negative relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and hedge ratio changes when companies remove their short positions on crude oil derivatives, and vice versa. We develop two hypotheses as follows:
there is a significantly positive relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes if companies announce to initiate short position on crude oil derivatives.
H 2 : there is a significantly negative relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes if companies announce to remove short position on crude oil derivatives.
Usually the information on corporate derivatives transactions is publicly available when 10-Q or 10-K forms are disclosed by SEC. The effective days and announcement days of derivatives position are not same. In some cases, about one or two months before these accounting are reported, companies may already enter into derivatives transactions. In other cases, companies enter derivatives transactions one or two months after they disclose their derivatives positions. The effective dates are different from announcement date, and thus there may be information leakage before or after companies disclose their hedging policies publicly.
To examine whether there is information leakage, this study examines the relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes around the effective date of derivatives position changes. The hypotheses are as follows:
there is a significantly positive relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes if companies initiate crude oil derivatives short transactions.
H 4 : there is a significantly negative relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes if companies remove crude oil derivatives short transactions.
After we identify the value effect of corporate commodity derivatives transactions, we continue to examine the magnitude of the value effect caused by transaction limitation. Firm size is used as a proxy variable for transaction limitation. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) present that larger companies have more of an advantage on information collection, doing research, and using more kinds of derivatives tools. The derivatives transactions by larger firms should have more effect on shareholders' diversification. Therefore, there should be a significantly positive relationship between CARs and firm sizes. We find a significant value effect when oil and gas producing firms remove short transactions of crude oil derivatives contracts. Therefore, the hypothesis is as follows:
H5: there is a significantly positive relationship between CARs and firm sizes if companies remove short positions on crude oil derivatives.
IV. Data and Sample
Following Haushalter (2000) , this paper constructs a database of oil and gas producers by selecting the companies with a primary SIC code of 1311. The For options, the direction is decided according to call or put transactions. For swaps, this study follows Guay's (1999) method to decide the direction of swap. A swap that obligates the firm to make fixed payments and receive floating payments is considered a long transaction, since the value of this swap is positively correlated with the underlying commodity price.
The sample selection process is as follows:
1. Corporations with derivatives transactions are chosen in terms of 10-K forms, 10-Q forms, and footnotes to annual reports. All the forms are collected from the EDGAR database. Keywords search is used to collect firms that report crude oil and gas derivatives transactions and other relevant strategies equivalent to derivatives transactions. Following Jin and
Jorion (2006) 4. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly production. The ratio of future quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the expected quarterly production is taken as the hedge ratio of new users. The ratio of quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the quarterly crude oil and gas production before companies stop using crude oil and gas derivatives is taken as the hedge ratio of new non-users.
Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios are negative.
<Insert Table 1 firm/dates that announce to stop using crude oil and gas related derivatives contracts. After clearing the contaminating transactions and checking the availability of hedge ratios data, we get 31 new non-users for oil and gas producing industry.
<Insert Table 2 about here>   Table 2 shows the profiles of new users and new non-users across time.
7 out 10 years the number of new non-users exceeds the number of new users. Oil and gas producers seem to be more likely to stop using commodity derivatives.
V. Methodology
Most studies apply cross-sectional methodology to examine whether derivative transactions are related to the proxy variables for market imperfections.
They compare the market imperfections proxy variables of firms with derivatives transactions and the market imperfections proxy variables of firms without derivatives transactions to see if there are significant differences. Guay (1999) points out an endogenous problem in cross-sectional studies on hedging. The derivative transaction announcement date or effective date is the event date, day 0, for each stock j. The estimation period is defined as a 250-day non-event window starting on day -310 through day -61. Equation (1) is estimated with ordinary least squares, and the predicted residual for each day in the prediction interval is defined as follows:
where j αˆand j βˆare the estimated OLS parameters from the estimation window, jt R is the return of stock j at time t, mt R is the market return at time t, and t is from the event window. The market return is the CRSP value -weighted market index return.
CAR is generated by calculating the cumulative prediction residual for each security j as a sum of the prediction errors over the event window examined. 
VI. Results
For oil and gas producing companies that start shorting energy commodities derivatives, Table 3 shows negative and significant market reactions, which is consistent with our forecast. The coefficients of hedge ratio change are 0.17, 0.12, and 0.29 for different event windows. For the event window (-30, 0) and (-30, 30) , the coefficients are significant at the 10% level. The market reactions are not as significant as the market reactions when companies stop shorting derivatives contract. This result means that when oil and gas producing companies start shorting, market reactions are marginally significant and negative.
Shareholders do not want oil and gas producers to short.
<Insert Table 3 about here> For oil and gas producing companies which stop shorting crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, Table 4 shows that there is a very significant and negative relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes, which is also consistent with our expectation. The coefficients of hedge ratio change are -0.02, -0.18, and -0.2 for different event windows. For the event window (0, 30) and (-30, 30) , the coefficients are significant at 1% level and 5% level respectively. Since hedge ratio of short position is negative, this result implies that if more short positions are removed, there will be more significant positive market reactions. Shareholders value these transactions very significantly. The F test also shows the whole regression relationship is very significant. Shareholders do not like oil and gas producers to hedge.
<Insert Table 4 about here> After examining the value effect around announcement days, we also investigate the value effect around effective days to see if there is information leakage. Table 5 and Table 6 tell us that there are no significant relationships between CARs around effective days and derivatives position changes for new users and new non-users. This result means that shareholders obtain the derivatives transactions information mainly from the publicly available sources, such as, 10 -Q and 10 -K forms. Before the disclosure of these reports, derivatives transactions policy information is not publicly available.
<Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here> We go further by investigating the magnitude of the value effect caused by transaction limitation. Table 7 shows the coefficient of firm size is positive and significant at 5% level. When larger oil and gas producers stop using oil and gas derivatives contracts, market reactions are more significantly positive.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
VII. Conclusion
Crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers can change the market value of shareholders' portfolios. If oil and gas producers stop shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices of these companies rise, and thus shareholders' wealth increases. If oil and gas producers start shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices of these companies drop, and thus shareholders' wealth decreases. Transaction limitation is identified as one possible source of the value effect.
The ideas introduced in this study have implications for future studies on corporate risk management activities. Further studies can examine the effectiveness of other types of derivatives transactions, such as interest rate and foreign exchange rate derivatives contracts. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly production. The ratio of future quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the expected quarterly production is taken as the hedge ratio of new users. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology, and the event windows include (-30,0),(0,30), (-30,30 For the CARs around the announcement of derivatives positions changes, we use announcement dates as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly production. The ratio of quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the quarterly crude oil and gas production before companies stop using crude oil and gas derivatives is taken as the hedge ratio of new non-users. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology, and the event windows include (-30,0),(0,30), (-30,30 This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly production. The ratio of future quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the expected quarterly production is taken as the hedge ratio of new users. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology, and the event windows include (-30,0),(0,30), (-30,30 The effective date is the effective date when derivatives contracts are initiated or removed. For the CARs around the actual derivatives positions changes, we take effective dates as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly production. The ratio of quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the quarterly crude oil and gas production before companies stop using crude oil and gas derivatives is taken as the hedge ratio of new non-users. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology, and the event windows include (-30,0),(0,30), (-30,30 
